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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
In the Yusuf and Kadi decisions of 2005, the European Court of First Instance 
(CFI) affirmed the absence of due process for individuals residing in EU 
Member States and whose assets were frozen, due to their blacklisting by the 
UN Security Council as ‘international terrorists’.1 This is but one concrete 
example of the increasing tension between fundamental human rights norms 
and other international obligations such as international peace and security in 
the post 9/11 era. In addition, it is a clear illustration of the direct relevance for 
individuals of the intensification in the shift of public decision-making away from 
the nation state towards international actors such as international 
organisations, as it can no longer be said that these decision are only of an 
inter-state nature.2
                                            
* B.Iur. LL.B. LL.D. (University of the Free State); LL.M. (Harvard); Habilitationsschrift 
(Zurich); Professor of International Constitutional Law, Universiteit van Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands; Extraordinary Professor, North-West University (Potchefstroom campus). 
This article constitutes a summary of a 5 year VICI project with the same title, which was 
awarded to the author by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) in 
December 2006. An adapted, more extensive version of the article also appears under the 
title "Zur Zukunft der Völkerrechtswissenchaft in Deutschland", see De Wet 2007 ZaöRV 
1-21. 
  
1  CFI 21 September 2005, case T-306/01; CFI 21 September 2005, case T-315/01; 
S/RES/1267 (15.10.1999); S/RES/1333 (19.12.2000); S/RES/1390 (16.01.2002); 
S/RES/1452 20.12.2002); S/RES/1455 (17.01.2003); S/RES/1456 (20.01.2003); 
S/RES/1526 (30 .01. 2004); S/RES/1617 (29.07.2005); S/RES/1699 (8.08.2006), available 
at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/. 
2  See also R. (on the application of Al-Jeddah) v Secretary of State for Defence [2005] 
EWHC 1809 (Admin) at par 55 ff. On 29 March 2006, the English Court of Appeal relied on 
the reasoning of the Yusuf and Kadi cases to justify the detention without trial of a British 
citizen in Iraq. The court accepted the State's argument that S/RES/1456 (20.01.2003) 
allowed the British military to suspend, in effect, individual rights such as the right to 
contest the lawfulness of one's detention under article 5(1) ECHR. At the time of writing, 
the case was on appeal before the House of Lords.  
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Moreover, the Yusuf and Kadi decisions illustrate the inability of any of the 
respective international legal subjects (UN, EU, Member States) to reconcile by 
itself its international obligations pertaining to human rights and (inter)national 
security in a manner that provides any meaningful legal protection to the 
affected individuals. These (clashing) international obligations also represent 
obligations that traditionally constituted core elements of the exercise of public 
power within the nation state, namely the protection of public safety versus the 
protection of individual liberties. Therefore the Yusuf and Kadi decisions 
poignantly illustrate the eroding impact of the continuous (re)-allocation of 
public power between different international legal subjects on the concept of a 
‘total’ constitutional order, where the fundamental substantive and structural 
norms that constitute the supreme legal framework for the exercise of public 
power are concentrated in the nation state.3 The decisions further underpin the 
submission that such a supreme legal framework is only possible in a system 
where national, regional (for example, EU), and functional (for example, WTO, 
UN) legal orders complement each other in order to form an international 
constitutional order.4
The fundamental substantive elements of the international constitutional order 
primarily include the value system of the international legal order, meaning 
norms of positive law with a strong ethical underpinning (notably human rights 
norms) that have acquired a special hierarchical standing vis-à-vis other 
international norms through state practice.
 
 
5
                                            
3  Walter 2001 German YIL 192. Schermers 1963 Internationale Spectator 292 ff. 
 The fundamental structural 
elements include the subjects of the international legal order that collectively 
form the international community and they provide mechanisms for the 
enforcement of the international value system. The international community is 
composed predominantly of states, which still remain central to international 
law-making and enforcement. Regional and functional organisations with legal 
4  De Wet 2006 ICLQ 51 ff. See also Kadelbach and Kleinlein 2006 AVR 235 ff. 
5  See also Dupuy 2005 EJIL 133. 
E DE WET   PER/PELJ 2007(10)2 
23/115 
personality (for example, EU, UN, WTO), and individuals also participate in the 
membership of the international community.6
The author argues that the term ‘constitution’ is not exclusively reserved for the 
supreme legal framework of (sovereign) States, as the fundamental legal 
framework of any community can be so defined.
 
 
7
That there is no reason to reserve the term ‘constitution’ for the supreme law of 
a sovereign State consisting of a single pouvoir constituant is already illustrated 
by the fact that federal States such as Germany and the United States 
recognise sub-national constitutions on the federated state level.
 ‘International constitutional 
law’ refers to the fundamental structural and substantive norms – unwritten as 
well as codified – of the international legal order as a whole, which contain the 
outer limitations for the exercise of public power. References to the 
‘constitutionalisation’ of the international legal order describe the process of  
(re-)allocation of competencies among the subjects of the international legal 
order that shape the international community and its value system. 
 
8 More 
importantly, however, the constitutionalisation process within the European 
Union (EU) that resulted in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe,9 
has challenged the notion that a constitutional order necessarily presupposes 
the existence of such a traditional constitutional demos. Europe's constitutional 
architecture has never been validated by a constitutional demos, which 
challenges one of the classic conditions of a constitution, namely the inherent 
association of a constitution and constitutional law with state- and 
peoplehood.10 Instead, the European constitutional order envisages competing 
(national) polities within a larger political order in the form of shared values and 
political organisation.11
                                            
6  De Wet 2006 LJIL 611-612. 
7  Fassbender 1998 CJTL 532-538; 555-61; Allott Eunomia 164. 
8  Beutler Das Staatsbild; Riegler Konflikte zwischen Grundgesetz und Länderverfassungen; 
Maddex State Constitutons. See also Weiler In Defence of the Status Quo 9. 
 It thus envisages the co-existence of national 
9  For the text of the European Constitution (which did not enter into force), see 47 OJ 2004 
(2004/C 310/01), also available at EU Main stages 2007 http://europa.eu/ 19 Nov. 
10  Weiler In Defence of the Status Quo 9. 
11  Maduro Europe and the Constitution, 82, 85; Walker Post-national Constitutionalism 34. 
Von Bogdandy and Bast (eds) Principles of European Constitutional Law. 
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constitutional orders within a supra-national constitutional order in the form of 
the EU. 
 
Another domain in which the use of constitutional language has become quite 
common, concerns the foundational treaties of international organisations. The 
constituent documents of international (functional) organisations, such as the 
WTO, the WHO, or the UN, are often described as the constitution of the 
organisation in question. When used in this context, the term refers to the fact 
that the constituent document of an international organisation is an international 
treaty of a special nature. Its object is to create a new subject of international 
law with a certain (law-making) autonomy, to which the states parties entrust 
the task of realising common goals.12 The constitutionalist approach to the law 
of international organisations is also an indication of the fact that the powers of 
international organisations have to be exercised in accordance with certain 
legal constraints, notably those articulated in its constituent document.13
                                            
12  ICJ, Advisory Opinion, 8.7.1996, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in 
Armed Conflict, par 19, available at 
 The 
constitution of an international organisation thus embodies the legal framework 
within which an autonomous community of a functional nature realises its 
respective functional goal, for example, trade liberalisation, human rights 
protection, or the maintenance of international peace and security.  
 
However, the use of the term ‘constitution’ is here extended beyond the above 
notions to describe a system in which the different national, regional and 
functional regimes form the building blocks of the international community 
('international polity') that is underpinned by a core value system common to all 
communities and embedded in a variety of legal structures for its enforcement. 
Through the inter-action of the different regimes, glued together by the 
international value system, the fundamental legal framework of the international 
legal order containing (inter alia) the outer limits for the exercise of public power 
emerges. 
 
http://www.icj-cij.org.  
13  Peters 2006 LJIL 579 ff.  
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The purpose of such an extension is related to the fact that the proliferation in 
recent years of functional regimes has lead some authors to question whether 
one can actually speak of one international community and one international 
value system. Instead, they see the emergence of a variety of functional 
regimes or ‘networks’. These functional regimes or networks are characterised 
by the absence of hierarchy between their respective normative systems, which 
would determine the outcome of any inter-regime conflicts.14
                                            
14  Walter Post-national Constitutionalism 173, 194-95, 198; Fischer-Lescano and Teubner 
2004 Mich JIL 999 ff; Slaughter A New World Order 131. 
  
 
The logical consequence of this line of argument would be that decisions such 
as those of the CFI in the Yusuf and Kadi cases in which human rights 
protection of individuals can effectively be abolished by functional regimes 
pertaining to (inter alia) peace and security, are likely to increase in an era 
where decisions of international organisations (functional regimes) are 
increasingly directed at individuals rather than States. This, in turn, is bound to 
result in a creeping (re-)establishment of absolute public power over private 
individuals. 
 
As a result, the author challenges the network approach by arguing that the 
different functional regimes within the international legal order function as 
complementary elements of a larger whole. This would be the embryonic 
international constitutional order within which an international value system 
characterised by hierarchical elements is emerging, which can provide some 
guidance for solving potential conflicts between regimes. Moreover, since the 
international value system is composed primarily of human rights norms (see 
below), inter-regime conflicts would be resolved in a way that prevents 
uncontrolled exercise of public power over private individuals.  
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2 The international versus regional value systems 
The rudimentary hierarchical characteristics of the international value system 
become very visible when contrasted to the more well-developed hierarchical 
dimensions of a regional value system, notably that of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
1950 (ECHR). Regional value systems can be defined in the same manner as 
the international value system, except that their reach is limited, for example to 
a particular geographic region, whereas the international value system is of a 
more universal nature.  
 
The rudimentary international value system is of a layered nature, that includes 
the (sometimes overlapping) layers of universal ius cogens norms and erga 
omnes obligations. As will be illustrated below, most of the international norms 
qualifying as ius cogens and/or erga omnes norms are human rights norms, 
which support the view that human rights have developed into the core of the 
international value system.15 The normatively superior character of ius cogens 
norms was introduced in positive international law through article 53 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969,16 with the primary aim of 
placing the deviation from peremptory norms beyond the treaty-making 
competence of States.17
The concept of erga omnes obligations gained recognition through the 
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), when it distinguished 
between the obligations of a state towards the international community as a 
whole, and those borne towards other (individual) States. In the Barcelona 
 
 
                                            
15  De Wet 2006 ICLQ. 
16  UN 2005 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties http://untreaty.un.org/ 19 Nov. A 53 
determines that: "A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, 
a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international 
law having the same character." 
17  See in particular Kadelbach Zwingendes Volkerrecht; Orakhelashvili Peremptory Norms. 
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Traction case,18 the ICJ determined that the former obligations are the concern 
of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be 
held to have a legal interest in their protection: they are obligations erga omnes. 
The notion of erga omnes obligations also finds recognition in the Articles on 
State Responsibility of 2001, where a distinction is drawn between breaches of 
bilateral obligations and obligations of a collective interest nature, which include 
obligations towards the international community as a whole.19
The Barcelona Traction decision of the ICJ provides authority for the conclusion 
that ius cogens norms would have erga omnes effect. Without expressly 
referring to ius cogens the ICJ implied as much by the types of (notably human 
rights) norms it mentioned as examples of erga omnes norms.
 
 
20 These 
included the out-lawing of the unilateral use of force, genocide and the 
prohibition of slavery and racial discrimination. Given the fact that these same 
prohibitions are widely regarded as being of a peremptory nature, one can 
conclude that a norm from which no derogation is permitted, because of its 
fundamental nature, will normally be applicable to all members of the legal 
community.21 One should be careful, however, not to assume that the opposite 
also applies, namely that all erga omnes norms would constitute peremptory 
norms of international law. 22
For example, the human rights obligations contained in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 (ICESCR) all have 
erga omnes effect to the extent that they have acquired customary international 
 
 
                                            
18  ICJ, Judgment, 5.2.1970, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (2nd Phase); ICJ 
Advisory Opinion, 9.7.2004, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, available at www.icj-cij.org. See also Report of the 
International Law Commission, A/61/10 (2006) 419, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/. 
19  See the commentary to a 42 and a 48 in Crawford (ed) Articles on State Responsibility; 
see also Report of the International Law Commission, A/61/10 (2006) 421. See generally 
Tams Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes.  
20  Frowein 1987 ZaöRV 71; Zemanek 2000 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 6-7; 
Report of the International Law Commission, A/61/10 (2006) 421.  
21  Frowein Obligations Erga Omnes 757; Report of the International Law Commission, 
A/61/10 (2006) 421. 
22  Report of the International Law Commission, A/61/10 (2006) 421.; Dupuy 2002 RCADI 
385. 
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law status.23 Their collective interest nature gives the international community 
as a whole an interest in their performance and shows that they amount to 
more than mere "bundles of bilateral obligations".24 At the same time, this fact 
does not in and of itself elevate all erga omnes human rights obligations to 
peremptory norms. The peremptory character of the prohibition of genocide and 
torture resulted from its specific recognition as such by a large majority of 
States.25
The practical value of this layered international value system is closely related 
to the question of its enforcement. In particular, the question arises whether the 
international community possesses structures capable of enforcing such a 
system and resolving potential conflicts between its different (hierarchical) 
components.
 Customary erga omnes norms without peremptory status would 
therefore constitute a second layer of the international value system, below that 
of peremptory norms. 
 
26 The author has argued elsewhere that at the current stage of 
development of the international constitutional order, the international value 
system has to be enforced within a variety of institutional structures, given the 
absence of a binding, centralised international judiciary.27
Such enforcement can benefit particularly from a potential spill-over effect of 
well developed regional value systems that show substantive resemblance to 
 It is therefore up to 
regional and functional judicial bodies, as well as national courts within 
domestic jurisdictions to enforce the emerging international value system in a 
decentralised fashion. 
 
                                            
23  The remaining obligations under the ICCPR and ICESCR would have erga omnes partes 
effect towards States parties. See Dupuy 2002 RCADI 382 fn 762; United Nations Human 
Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment No. 31 [80] Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 v. 
26.05.2004, par 2. See also Seiderman Hierarchy in International Law 145. 
24  See Crawford (ed) Articles on State Responsibility 258. 
25  Report of the ILC, A/61/10 (2006) 421. For an overview of the jurisprudence concerning 
the peremptory character of the prohibition of genocide and torture, respectively, see 
Dupuy 2002 RCADI 295-299. For a discussion of the relationship between ius cogens en 
erga omnes obligations, see inter alia Byers 1997 Nordic Journal of International Law 112 
ff; Bassiouni 1996 Law and Contemporary Problems 63 ff; De Hoogh 1991 Österreichische 
Zeitschrift für öffentliches und Völkerrecht 183 ff; Annacker 1994 AJPIL 131 ff. 
26  See Fischer-Lescano 2003 ZaöRV 734 ff. 
27  De Wet 2006 ICLQ 64 ff. 
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the international value system and that have strong enforcement mechanisms. 
The most advanced example in this regard is the ECHR, which has been 
concretised by the binding jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR). Moreover, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has elevated the 
ECHR to a ‘European constitutional order’ with normative superiority vis-à-vis 
other international obligations of member States.28 This can inter alia be 
deduced from the manner in which the ECtHR reviews the application of rules 
flowing from treaties or customary law against ECHR obligations. The 
underlying rationale for such review seems to be that the norms protected by 
the ECHR would be of a hierarchically superior nature vis-à-vis other norms of 
public international law. Member States would be prohibited from giving effect 
to public international law obligations if and to the extent that they were not 
compatible with the human rights criteria laid down in the ECHR.29
The range of cases in which the ECtHR has reviewed the application of public 
international law obligations against the obligations in the ECHR suggest that 
the latter's normative superiority would, in principle, apply to all rights in the 
ECHR.
  
 
Admittedly, it is arguable that the ECHR merely resolved conflicts between 
international obligations by means of an inherent functional bias, i.e. by giving 
preference to the very obligations for which it was created to enforce. This 
would not necessarily imply the ECtHR's intention to elevate ECHR obligations 
to a normatively superior position vis-à-vis other international obligations. 
However, it is submitted that through repeated references to the constitutional 
character of the ECHR and its role as an instrument of ‘European public order’, 
the ECtHR indeed took a stand on the general normative superiority of ECHR 
obligations.  
 
30
                                            
28  Frowein 1992 Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law 267 ff; Sudre Existe-il 
un ordre public européen? 39 ff. See also Walter 1999 ZaöRV 979-980; Hoffmeister 2002 
Der Staat 362-363; Orakhelashvili 2004 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 
246. 
29  Walter 1999 ZaöRV 979-980. 
30  De Wet 2006 LJIL 618 ff. 
 Stated differently, it would apply to absolute rights that may not be 
restricted or derogated from, even in times of war or public emergency (for 
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example, the prohibitions on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
and punishment);31 rights that may be restricted for narrower purposes such as 
in times of emergency (for example, the right to a fair trial);32 and rights that 
may be restricted for broader purposes, such as public safety, the protection of 
public order, the prevention of crime and the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others (for example, the right to privacy and family life; the right to 
vote, and the right to property).33
This case law further illustrates that an international obligation appearing to be 
in conflict with an ECHR obligation would not automatically be trumped by the 
latter. The ECtHR would first attempt to balance and reconcile the different 
international obligations at stake. This is particularly the case where decisions 
of binding obligations of international organisations are at stake.
 
 
34
                                            
31  Soering v. The United Kingdom, (Application No. 14038/88), Judgment, 07.07.1989; Iorgov 
v. Bulgaria, (Application No. 40653/98), Judgment, 7.07.2004, unpublished; Mamatkulov & 
Askarov v. Turkey, ( Application No. 46827/99; 46951/99), Judgment, 4.02.2005; Öcalan v. 
Turkey (Application No. 46221/99), Judgment, 12.05.2005; all judgments available at 
 However, the 
fact remains that all rights and obligations under the ECHR have the potential 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int. See also Dugard and Van den Wyngaert 1998 AJIL 210 ff. 
32  Waite and Kennedy v. Germany (Application No. 26083/94), Judgment, 18.02.1999; Al 
Adsani v. United Kingdom, (Application No. 35763/97), Judgment 21.11.2001; Fogarty v. 
United Kingdom, (Application No. 37112/97), Judgment, 21.11.2001; McElhinney v. Ireland 
(Application No. 31253/96), Judgment, 21.11.2001; Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve 
Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, (Application no. 45036/98), Judgment, 20.06.2005; all 
judgments available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int. 
33  Matthews v. United Kingdom, (Application No. 24833/94), Judgment, 18.02.1999; Slivenko 
v. Latvia, (Application No. 48321/99), Judgment, 9.07.2003; Bosphorus Hava Yollari 
Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, (Application No. 45036/98), Judgment, 
20.06.2005; all judgments available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int. 
34  Eg, in Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, (Application No. 
45036/98), Judgment, 20.06.2005, the ECtHR adopted a presumption of conformity of the 
actions of EU organs with the obligations contained in the ECHR. See also the decisions 
of Agim Behrami and Bekir Behrami v. France (Application No. 71412/01), Judgment, 
31.05.2007; and Ruzhdi Saramati v. France, Norway and Germany (Application No. 
78166/01), Judgment, 31.05.2007. Judgments are available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int. 
The ECtHR did not accept effective (extra-territorial) control by the member states in 
question in Kosovo at the time when the alleged violation of the right to life (Art 2) and the 
right to deny the legality of one's detention (Art 5(1)) of the ECHR occurred in 2000 and 
therefore declared the case inadmissible. At the time the states in question formed part of 
the NATO forces in Kosovo, whose presence was authorised under S/RES/1244 
(10.06.1999). The ECtHR's rather convoluted arguments in finding an absence of effective 
control on the part of the states reflects a reluctance to deal with cases in which it is 
directly confronted with reviewing United Nations Security Council Resolutions such as 
S/RES/1244 (10.06.1999). 
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to trump conflicting obligations under international custom or treaty law in 
instances of irreconcilable conflict. 
 
 
3 The spill-over effect 
The question that now arises is whether this well developed regional 
constitutional order can strengthen the normative superiority of the international 
value system (and therefore the international constitutional order) through a 
spill-over effect. Given its role as the most advanced international system for 
the protection of human rights, the ECHR is bound to have a significant impact 
on the interpretation and application of human rights obligations contained in 
other human rights instruments. Therefore, to the extent that the substance of 
the European public order overlaps with the international value system as a 
whole, the former is bound to contribute to the strengthening of the normative 
superiority of the latter.  
 
At this point one has to underline that other regional human rights regimes 
would in principle be capable of a similar spill-over effect. However, in light of 
the ECHR's well-developed jurisprudence and that it is already having a 
significant influence on the interpretation of the UN and other regional human 
rights instruments, it is empirically justified to commence an analysis of the 
"spill-over effect phenomena" with the ECHR. A next step would then be to 
examine the extent of a similar spill-over effect of the remaining regional human 
rights regimes on the international value system as a whole. 
 
This spill-over effect of the ECHR is partly realised through the jurisprudence of 
other international or regional human rights bodies. To name but one example, 
it is well known that the reasoning of the ECtHR in the Soering decision was 
subsequently followed by the UN Human Rights Committee in Ng v Canada.35
                                            
35  HRC, Decision, 5.11.1993, Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991; HRC, Decision, 
30.07.1993 Kindler v. Canada, Communication No. 470/1990; HRC, Decision, 20.12.2003 
Judge/ Canada, Communication No. 829/1998 at 
 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/. See 
also Dugard and Van den Wyngaert 1998 AJIL 192. 
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Similarly, this Committee has followed the ECtHR's approach to reservations in 
suggesting the severing of reservations to the ICCPR that were in violation of 
its object and purpose.36
Some evidence of national courts attributing a hierarchically superior status to 
international human rights norms does exist. For example, in the case of 
Netherlands v Short,
 
 
However, the spill-over effect can also be realised through the jurisprudence of 
other international judicial bodies (for example, CFI, ECJ, WTO panels, ICSID 
arbitration panels) or national courts – if and to the extent that they are 
confronted with conflicts between international human rights obligations and 
other international obligations binding on the parties to the dispute. In fact, the 
existence of a spill-over effect on functional judicial bodies and national courts 
would reflect the broader normative impact of international human rights norms 
outside the functional area of human rights. Whereas one may expect that 
international human rights bodies functioning within similar functional 
parameters would all accord a higher status to human rights obligations vis-à-
vis other international obligations, the same could not necessarily be said of 
(other) functional judicial bodies or national courts. These bodies operate within 
a different or, in the case of national courts, much broader functional 
parameter. If they would nonetheless (consistently) allow international human 
rights obligations to trump other international obligations in case of 
irreconcilable conflict, this would be evidence of an increasing general 
recognition of the hierarchically superior status of the international value system 
and the strengthening of the international constitutional order as a whole.  
 
37
                                            
36  See HRC General Comment No. 24, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, 4. 11. 2004. For the ECtHR 
see Belilos v. Switzerland (Application No. 10328/83), Judgment, 29.4.1988; Loizidou v. 
Turkey Application (No. 15318/89), Judgment, 25.03.1995, available at 
 the Dutch Supreme Court refused the extradition to the 
United States of an American soldier suspected of having murdered his wife in 
the Netherlands, despite the fact that such extradition was required under the 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int. See also Francioni 1999 Italian YIL 22-23. 
37  HR. 30.3.1990, Par. 7.4, English translation available in International Legal Materials 29 
(1990), 1375 ff. 
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NATO Status of Forces Treaty of 1951.38 Under the influence of the Soering 
case, the Dutch court feared a violation of Article 3 ECHR, as there was a real 
risk of the accused being subjected to the "death row phenomena".39
More recent examples of the role of national courts in this regard inter alia 
include two decisions pertaining to article 6(1) ECHR. In the case of Siedler v 
Western European Union,
 
 
40 the Belgian Court of Appeal waived the immunity of 
the Western European Union (WEU) in a case that concerned a labour dispute 
between the WEU and one of its employees. Under the influence of the ECtHR 
Waite and Kennedy decision,41 the Belgian court determined that the internal 
Appeals Commission of the WEU did not provide adequate alternative legal 
protection in terms of article 6(1) of the ECHR. Similarly, the French Court of 
Cassation recently declared a case admissible that concerned a dispute 
between the African Development Bank (BAD) and one of its employees, 
despite the immunity enjoyed by the former. In Banque Africaine de 
Developpement v M.A. Degboe42
Although these decisions primarily strengthen the European public order, they 
can also result in an indirect strengthening of the international value system as 
whole, for it is possible that these decisions may influence other national courts 
or international bodies to apply a similar reasoning to more universal human 
rights instruments such as the ICCPR. It is significant that in the Degboe case, 
the French Court of Cassation not merely made reference to a violation of 
article 6(1) ECHR (and therefore the European public order), but to a violation 
 the Court of Cassation justified the BAD's 
waiver of immunity on the basis that the impossibility of a party to a civil dispute 
to bring the case before a court of law that renders binding decisions, 
constituted a denial of justice that violated the international public order.  
 
                                            
38  Treaty of 17.06.1951, Trb (1951) 114, Trb (1953). 
39  See also De Wet 2006 LJIL 629-630. 
40  Siedler v Western European Union, Brussels Labour Court of Appeal (4th chamber), 17 
September 2003, JT 2004, 617; ILDC 53 (BE 2003). 
41  Waite and Kennedy v. Germany (Application No. 26083/94), Judgment, 18.02.1999, 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int. 
42  Judgment, 25.01.2005, Banque Africaine de Developpement v. M.A.Degboe, Nr. 04-
41012, available at http://www.courdecassation.fr/.  
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of the international public order. This is already an indication of a spill-over 
effect of the ECHR on the international value system as a whole. 
 
Another interesting case is the Rukundo decision of the Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court.43 This decision involved a request by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) – a tribunal that was created by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter44
The Swiss court thus incidentally reviewed the legality of a Security Council 
resolution when scrutinising the domestic measures that implemented the 
resolution. In doing so, it reviewed the actions of the Security Council against 
obligations in the ECHR as well as the ICCPR. It affirmed – at least in principle 
– the normative superiority of both human rights instrument vis-à-vis binding 
Security Council resolutions in case of conflict. In this fashion the Swiss court 
strengthened both the regional and international value systems.
 – for the transfer of Mr. Rukundo 
by the Swiss authorities to the ICTR. Mr. Rukundo claimed that the procedure 
before the ICTR would not satisfy the fair trial standards under articles 6 ECHR 
and 14 of the ICCPR. The Federal Supreme Court emphasised that 
Switzerland would not support international proceedings that did not guarantee 
those basic human rights in the ICCPR and the ECHR that constituted 
elements of the international public order. 
 
45
Even so, the rhetorical willingness of the Swiss Court to acknowledge the 
normative supremacy of human rights obligations - also in relation to 
obligations flowing from the United Nations Charter - forms a clear contrast with 
 At the same 
time the Court was at pains to interpret the different international obligations in 
a harmonious fashion. It acknowledged the strong presumption of legality of a 
judicial body created on the authority of the Security Council and concluded 
that the procedural defects of the ICTR were not of such a nature as to rebut 
the presumption of their conformity with international human rights obligations. 
 
                                            
43  Judgment, 3.9.2001, Emmanuel Rukundo v. l'Office fédéral de la justice; Nr. 1A.129/2001, 
available at http://www.bger.ch/.  
44  S/RES955 (8.11.1994). 
45  De Wet and Nollkaemper 2002 German YIL 192 ff. 
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the Yusuf and Kadi decisions of the CFI,46
4 Conclusion 
 in which the right to a fair trial was 
outweighed by obligations under the UN Charter pertaining to international 
peace and security.  
 
 
One could therefore conclude that there is already some evidence of a 
hierarchically superior international value system that draws inspiration and 
strength from a regional value system in the form of the ECHR. At the same 
time, however, the international value system remains fragile (especially in 
relation to obligations pertaining to international peace and security).  
 
Moreover, extensive analysis of the practice of regional, sectoral and national 
(judicial) bodies has yet to be undertaken, in order to determine whether over 
time, the spill-over effect of the ECHR (and other regional human rights 
regimes) on the international value system will strengthen the latter to the point 
where all customary human rights obligations with erga omnes effect enjoy a 
superior standing in the international legal order which is similar to that of the 
ECHR on a regional level. Whether or not it would be accurate to describe the 
(core content) of the rights in the EHCR as constituting regional jus cogens, it 
nevertheless cannot be denied that these obligations have a special normative 
standing in international law.  
 
In essence therefore, it remains to be examined whether the spill-over effect of 
the ECHR (and other regional human rights regimes) on the international value 
system would strengthen the latter to the point where all customary human 
rights obligations with erga omnes proper effect enjoy a superior standing – 
regardless of whether they strictly qualify as peremptory norms of international 
law. The true test for this development would lie in the extent to which courts 
and functional regimes outside the system of human rights acknowledge the 
                                            
46  See also R. (on the application of Al-Jeddah) v Secretary of State for Defence [2005] 
EWHC 1809 (Admin) at par 55 ff as discussed in note 2 above. 
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normatively superior standing of international human rights obligations vis-à-vis 
other international obligations.  
 
By engaging in such an analysis, one would effectively examine the extent to 
which a supreme (legal) framework for the (control over) the exercise of public 
power can be found in the interaction between national, regional and functional 
regimes and the core value system common to all regimes.  
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